Archive for the ‘Neutrality’ Tag
The Utah Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission has posted its first formal evaluation of judges based on procedural-fairness criteria. The commission has evaluated the 25 Utah judges up for retention in the November 2012 election.
Utah is the first state to provide detailed evaluations of judges’ behavior in the courtroom based on procedural-fairness criteria. The Utah commission is required by law to provide a public evaluation of each judge up for retention, and the statute setting up the commission requires that its evaluations be based in part on observation of each judge in the courtroom. The commission adopted an administrative regulation providing for a corps of trained citizen volunteers who would observe each judge in the courtroom. Those administrative regulations also require that the judges be evaluated on procedural-fairness criteria: voice (e.g., whether the judge gave parties an adequate opportunity to be heard), neutrality (e.g., whether the judge displayed fairness and provided transparency in rulings), and respect (e.g., whether the judge demonstrated courtesy toward all who appeared before him or her). At least four different observers are used for each judge.
Through this program, Utah became the first state to evaluate judges specifically on procedural-fairness criteria. Two other states—Alaska and Colorado—have used courtroom observers as part of a judicial-evaluation program, but neither provided specific criteria for evaluating the judge’s adherence to procedural-fairness principles.
For the 25 judges up for retention this year, all were approved for retention, though three judges were approved with one dissent in 11-to-1 votes. In two of those cases, although the judges had positive ratings from attorneys, courtroom observers had raised some concerns and at least one courtroom observer had said that he or she would feel uncomfortable appearing in front of the judge.
Skeptics might suggest that when all 25 judges are approved for retention, the evaluation process isn’t meaningful. But there can be effects that are not obvious to us that occur over time in jurisdictions that do formal judicial evaluations: Judges who receive poor scores or would not be recommended for retention sometimes decide to retire or to return to practice rather than seek retention. In such cases, the draft evaluation or interim evaluation they have received does its job without requiring voters to act. (I have no idea whether this happened this year in Utah; I merely suggest that it does happen to some extent in jurisdictions with evaluation programs. But since evaluations are publicly released only for judges who stand for retention, there’s no public record from which we can determine how many judges voluntarily leave the bench based on negative evaluations.)
Adding courtroom observations focused on procedural-fairness criteria can be expected to improve judicial performance in this critical area. Utah’s efforts are to be commended.
For those wanting more information about the process in Utah, take a look at a recent article in the American Judges Association journal, Court Review, by Nicholas H. Woolf, a consultant to the Utah commission, and Jennifer MJ Yim, a commission member, or you can review a paper I presented to the Utah state judicial conference in September 2011.
Steve Leben
by Tom Tyler
Recent events in New York City make it clear that there is widespread and continuing anger over the street stop policies of the NYPD. This ongoing discontent reflects a broader paradox in American policing: the police have become more effective in reducing the rate of violent crime to historically low levels but their success has not led to higher levels of public trust in the police. There are lessons from this police experience not only for police commanders but also for judges, court administrators, and others working in the criminal justice system.
Based upon my own research and that of other social scientists we know why this performance without legitimacy paradox is occurring. Public anger continues because the police have not addressed what actually matters to the public. My research shows that police legitimacy is based upon how fairly the public thinks the police exercise their authority. Until the police change their policies and practices to address public concerns over procedural justice, controversies over police practices such as racial profiling, police street stops and the surveillance of Muslim Americans will not end.
Many cities, including New York City are experiencing dramatically lower levels of violent crime. Despite these gains public trust and confidence in the police is not increasing, nor is the large racial gap in trust and confidence between White and minority Americans closing. Better performance has not lead to greater public legitimacy. Why? Police leaders are failing to take account of public concerns. Evaluations of policies and practices by police leaders ask if they are effective in preventing crimes. The question of whether these policies and practices are viewed as legitimate by people in the community is not addressed. My research findings however tell us that effectiveness is not the key factor that the public considers when reacting to police policies and practices.
What does the public care about? Research shows that the key issue to members of the public is their evaluation of the fairness of the way the police exercise their authority: i.e. to issues of procedural justice. More than anything else people are concerned about whether they feel that the police officers to whom they give the authority to maintain order in their communities act using fair procedures.
What does the public mean by fair procedures? They mean first that when creating policies the police work with the community to identify problems and the strategies that should be used to address them. When dealing with particular citizens they allow those people to tell their side of the story, to explain their situation, before making decisions. When implementing the law the police explain their policies and how they are being applied in particular cases in ways that the public can see are neutral and unbiased.
The public also means that the police should treat people fairly. Fair treatment is respectful and courteous. It acknowledges people’s rights not to be demeaned, ridiculed or insulted by the police. And, the police are trustworthy. They act with integrity, accounting for their actions in ways that show good faith responsiveness to people and their problems.
Why should the police care about this public perspective on policing? Insensitivity to public concerns has led police departments like the NYPD to turn victory into defeat. Instead of being congratulated for lowering the rate of violence in New York City, or reducing the rate of unlawful shootings, the police are reviled by an angry population for mistreating people in the community.
And the police lose the benefits of public cooperation. Studies show that when people view the police as more legitimate they are more willing to defer to police authority; less likely to resist and defy the police; and that complaints against the police go down. Legitimacy further encourages willing compliance with the law and cooperation with police efforts in their efforts to stop crimes and identify criminals. When fairly treated people are more willing to work with the police in efforts that join the police and the people in the community in efforts to maintain order by attending community meetings or joining a neighborhood watch.
If officers dealt with people seeking to communicate respect and deliver fairness they would be working not only to prevent crime but to build public support for the police. And, more broadly legal authorities need to recognize the value of considering their policies and practices from the perspective of public concerns. That perspective emphasizes that people are “seekers of justice” and evaluate their experiences with the police and courts by evaluating how fairly they experience the actions of the authorities they deal with.
Tom Tyler, Professor of Law and Psychology, Yale University
So we will need to wait until Thursday for the Supreme Court’s decision on the Affordable Care Act. Interest runs high. Today, nearly 100,000 people signed on to a live blog from Scotusblog.com to see whether the Court had ruled on the healthcare case and, if so, in what way.
We previously considered the healthcare cases from a procedural-fairness viewpoint. We gave the Court a passing grade for procedural fairness at oral argument: the two justices most closely watched, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, asked questions of attorneys both for and against the law, and each tried to explore the issues in an even-handed way. (See our April 3 blog entry.) We also noted that diffuse, long-term support for the Court has usually stood resilient in the face of short-term disagreements over specific cases. (See our April 13 blog entry.)
But there are also reasons for concern—that the Court’s decision in the healthcare cases may prove particularly significant in their impact on long-term public support for the Court as an institution. Gallup checks public approval of the Court before each September, just before the Court begins its new term. Approval in 2011 was down to 46%, down 15% in two years and lower than all but one other reading since 1973. At the same time (Sept. 2011), Gallup reported historically high levels of negativity toward all of the federal government, with 81% dissatisfied, an historic level.
One important factor in maintaining public support for the Court is the public’s perception that their concerns and interests are fairly considered there. But that’s not the expectation as we await the healthcare decision. A Washington Post-ABC News survey in April showed that 50% thought the Court would rule based on “partisan political views,” with only 40% saying it would rule “on the basis of the law” and the remaining 10% undecided.
Public reaction to two past decisions offers some insight into the likely impact of next Thursday’s ruling on public opinion; they suggest caution against over-reading any immediate reaction in public opinion to the healthcare decisions. The first is Kelo v. City of New London, the Court’s 2005 eminent-domain decision. It was coincidentally issued one day before Gallup began a three-day opinion survey about Court approval, and the 42% approval rating (compared to 48% disapproving) is the lowest measurement for Court approval during the history of the poll (1973 to present). But the Court’s approval quickly rebounded—to 48% by the annual survey in September 2005 and back to 60% a year later. The second is Bush v. Gore, the 2000 decision that had obvious political overtones. But the Court’s approval ratings were 62% in September 2000, 59% in January 2001, and 62% in June 2001, showing no ill effects on overall public approval.
Even with these cautionary words, however, we believe the healthcare cases may present a more significant problem—and opportunity—for the Court with respect to maintaining its long-term, diffuse support (what we sometimes call its legitimacy). Interest is high, and public skepticism with its national government is high too.
Polls have also shown that the public wants to see some or all of the law struck down. A New York Times/CBS News poll earlier this month had 41% wanting it struck down altogether and another 27% wanting to keep the law but overturn the individual mandate to buy insurance. But there still are millions of Americans who want the entire law kept in place, and all will be watching to see how their concerns have been taken into account.
The Court could improve its standing if it has reached consensus by at least six justices, which would demonstrate its ability to reach consensus on neutral principles that transcend party affiliation. In addition, to the extent that the Court’s written opinions honestly acknowledge the sincerity of opposing views, while carefully explaining the basis for the decision (or dissent), they will foster the appearance of a respectful institution that takes the people’s concerns seriously. In short, the justices will be viewed as having followed a fair process to reach its decision.
Steve Leben, David Rottman & Kevin Burke
In our last blog post, we said that the public attitudes about the judicial system at all levels could be significantly impacted by how well the justices of the United States Supreme Court adhered during oral argument to the elements of procedural fairness—voice, neutrality, respect, and trustworthy authorities. So how did the justices do? It’s an important question: This case has the potential to increase the sense of legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking, and it also has the potential to be a train wreck. Despite the importance of oral arguments, whether one of those two extremes will occur will be very dependent upon the final written opinion. But the oral arguments certainly set the stage for how people will view the process by which this case is decided.
On the whole, the justices performed reasonably well during oral arguments. Most asked good questions that seemed to be honest attempts to explore the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s positions. And this was certainly the case for the two justices whose role in the oral arguments probably mattered the most in public perception: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy—Roberts because as chief justice he runs the show, and Kennedy because he is widely seen as the swing justice these days when the court is closely divided.
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy asked questions of attorneys both for and against the Affordable Care Act. And both tried to explore the issues in an even-handed way. For example, while Roberts asked tough questions of the government’s lawyer regarding the individual mandate, he also interrupted one of the attorneys arguing the other side to have him respond to what Roberts perceived as the government’s main point. Kennedy openly discussed “concerns” he had regarding each side’s position. To opponents of the law, Kennedy asked that they address his “concern in the case” that the young person who chooses to be uninsured is “very close to affecting” insurance rates for others “in a way that is not true in other industries.” Kennedy also asked detailed questions of the government, which based part of its defense on the principle that the government had exercised its taxing power as authority for the mandate for each individual to buy health insurance. Kennedy asked them to assume that the government indeed could have used its taxing power and directly created a single-payer national health plan. He then said that “it can be argued that this is what the government is doing; [the government] ought to be honest about the power it’s using and use the correct power,” to which the government’s attorney provided a response.
Chief Justice Roberts acted evenhandedly in presiding over the arguments. Although the justices and frequent court-watchers may be used to it, the public was no doubt surprised by how often justices interrupted one another—and also interrupted attorneys while the attorney was still responding to another justice’s question. Roberts frequently asked attorneys to return to the question that had initially been asked by another justice but not fully answered, ensuring that the advocates had a fair chance to respond to the important questions that the justices had posed to them. From a fairness standpoint, however, it would be much better if justices didn’t interrupt each other so frequently, and if they allowed attorneys to finish their answers to other justices’ questions.
Media accounts of the arguments have tended to focus on attempts to predict the outcome based upon questions asked or attitudes exhibited during oral argument. Arguments from judges who have carefully studied the briefs often will produce some questions that express tentative positions, which is to be expected. While that may be the case, most of the questions still were usually fair ones that gave the attorneys a chance to respond to what the justices saw as weaknesses in their positions. Appellate advocates appreciate having the chance to address the points that are on the minds of the justices, and the justices generally gave them that chance.
Experienced lawyers—and judges—will tell you to be cautious about reading too much into a judge’s questions and comments during oral argument. Sometimes a judge will ask questions to confirm a tentative position the judge has arrived at based on the briefs. Sometimes a judge is aware of concerns a colleague has and will use the oral argument to garner support for a majority opinion. Sometimes a judge really has reached an immovable position. Two respected federal appellate judges once kept track—for 10 months—of how often oral argument had changed their minds in a case; one judge said it had 31 percent of the time and the other 17 percent. The confidence of pundits notwithstanding, it’s not always possible to tell how a case will come out based on the oral argument.
Only one justice simply seemed tone-deaf at times to the principles of procedural fairness: Justice Antonin Scalia. From a fairness standpoint, the public wants to perceive that the justices are considering the issues based on neutral legal principles, not in any political way. Yet Justice Scalia was the only one to introduce partisan politics directly into the discussion.
During the argument about whether the Medicaid provisions were unconstitutionally coercive on the states, attorney Paul D. Clement was explaining that 26 states thought it was a bad deal for them. Scalia interrupted and framed the issue as a purely political one: “Mr. Clement, I didn’t take the time to figure this out, but maybe you did. Is there any chance that all 26 States opposing it have Republican governors, and all of the States supporting it have Democratic governors? Is that possible?” Clement replied, “There’s a correlation, Justice Scalia.” The transcript shows that Scalia then said, “Yes,” followed by laughter from the audience. Scalia left it there, and another justice asked an unrelated question.
No one—Scalia, Clement, or anyone else—suggested how the party affiliation of the governors could relate to the legal issue being discussed. As far as we can tell, Scalia injected partisan politics directly into the discussion at this point solely to lead to a laugh line. Humor does have a place in arguments before judges. But a judge interjecting humor should be careful. Justice Scalia’s laugh line may well have come at a cost, as it undermined what we presume is the court’s desired perception that it decides case like this based on neutral legal principles, without consideration of partisan political overtones.
Justice Scalia made at least one other potentially questionable comment. In an argument of this length, people—and justices are people—do make mistakes, but this mistake was profound and went to undermining the trust people need to have about judges. When discussing whether the entire law should be struck down if the court strikes down the individual mandate, Justice Scalia made a perjorative reference to a provision that was contained in the Affordable Care Act but ultimately did not become law: “[I]f we struck down nothing in this legislation but the—what’s it called, the Cornhusker kickback . . . [i]t was the means of getting the last necessary vote in the Senate. And you are telling us that the whole statute would fall because the Cornhusker kickback is bad. That can’t be right.” Using the term “kickback” in referring to a provision that provided benefits to one state, Nebraska, in exchange for the vote of its senator sounds more like a political attack ad than the sort of question a neutral judge would ask. It’s odd that Justice Scalia would ask such a question because his consistent position is that in interpreting statutes, legislative-history materials (like Congressional debate transcripts) should not be consulted, let alone the sort of media coverage that led to public discussion of the Nebraska provision. And while the provision Scalia refers to as the “Cornhusker kickback” was in the Affordable Care Act, another bill repealed it before it took effect. So the use of this example seems gratuitously partisan, even if that was not the intention.
Justice Scalia made one other comment that runs contrary to the image the public wants for its Supreme Court justices, and once again he ran aground by attempting to inject humor into the proceedings. When the attorneys were arguing about whether some of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act could remain in effect if the individual-mandate provision is struck down, Scalia invoked the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment while expressing astonishment that the attorney had suggested justices review the full statute to determine what could remain in effect: “[W]hat happened to the Eighth Amendment? You really want us to go through these 2,700 pages?” The transcript shows laughter in response. But Scalia ended the exchange with a more serious suggestion that it really was unfair to ask a Supreme Court justice to read the Affordable Care Act in full: “Is this not totally unrealistic? That we’re going to go through this enormous bill item by item and decide each one?”
Other justices suggested that such a review wasn’t needed, anyway, based on the nuances of past Supreme Court cases on how to decide whether to strike down an entire statute or only parts of it. But a member of the public listening to the argument could easily have been left with the impression that Justice Scalia—a lifetime appointee to the nation’s highest court—wasn’t willing to take the time to read the full statute passed by Congress to make his decision. The public wants judges who will take all the time needed to make a good decision on an important issue, and the public certainly regards the issues in play here as important ones.
It’s too early to fully evaluate the court’s handling of these cases from a procedural-fairness standpoint. The written opinion or opinions of the justices are likely to have a much more profound impact on how the American people view judicial decisionmaking than the oral arguments. Ideally, the opinion would be joined by more than five justices, which itself would suggest that the justices reached consensus on neutral principles that transcend party affiliation. But whatever the vote margin, opinions that honestly acknowledge the sincerity of opposing views while carefully explaining the basis for the decision (or dissent) will help the nation to respect the judicial process. Anything less could cause lasting damage.
Steve Leben and Kevin Burke
Beginning Monday, March 26, 2012, public attention will focus on the United States Supreme Court in a way that’s essentially unprecedented. Sure, there have been many important cases in the Court’s history, but few have had timing like this. It’s a Presidential-election year. The health-care cases divide the country, even if the precise legal issues are not yet well understood by the public. And there are lots of pundits poised to comment, few of whom will actually be objective.
In this environment, the Court will hold three days of oral arguments on issues surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—the 2,400-page law called Obamacare by its detractors and the Affordable Care Act by its supporters. The nation’s 24-hour news cycle will be focused like a laser beam on the Court, but there will be no television cameras, no live radio broadcast, and no blogging, twitter, or other reporting from the courtroom.
Even so, what the public perceives about whether the justices gave a fair hearing to both sides may have a lasting impact on public attitudes toward the judicial system at all levels. What will the public be looking for? And is the Court equipped to provide it?
Based on decades of research, the public will be looking for the elements of procedural fairness—voice, neutrality, respect, and trustworthy authorities. To be sure, the public will also make judgments about the merits of this case. But there is a lot more at stake: the legitimacy of the judicial process is also being tested.
To pass that test with the public, the Supreme Court needs to conduct the argument with a keen eye on the goal of demonstrating that courts decide issues in a way different than the political debates of a presidential campaign or the legislative process. Among other things, to achieve procedural fairness, the justices will need to let attorneys actually make some points without being interrupted, to appear willing to listen (better yet, actually be willing to listen), and to avoid arguing from a clearly predetermined position.
The normal case in the U.S. Supreme Court gets one hour for oral argument. This case is getting five and one-half hours spread out over three days. Allowing that extra time was wise from many perspectives. First, justices who want to explore the issues along with the advocates will have the time to do so, rather than feeling the need to quickly stake out a position and argue for it in an attempt to persuade colleagues in advance of the justices’ private case conference where decisions are made. Second, media coverage will emphasize the extent of time devoted to hearing argument in the case, said to be unprecedented in the modern era. Third, the media will be able to explain each of the major issues during the time slot in which argument is being made.
But even with ample time, the attitudes demonstrated by the justices will frame perceptions of their fairness. Senator John McCain attended the oral argument on the McCain-Feingold campaign-finance bill that he had sponsored. When the Court ultimately ruled in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) that the government could not ban political spending by corporations in candidate elections, Sen. McCain spoke in an interview about the attitudes he had observed during oral argument:
“I was not surprised at the Supreme Court decision. I went over there to observe the oral arguments. It was clear that Justice Roberts, Alito, and Scalia, by their very skeptical and even sarcastic comments, were very much opposed to [the law.].” (CBS, Face the Nation, Jan. 24, 2010.)
Sen. McCain has certainly been around the block and heard harsh attacks. Yet he remembered several months after oral argument that there had been “very skeptical and even sarcastic comments” made by several justices.
Even though the Court refused C-SPAN’s request to televise the hearings, the Court will expedite release of transcripts and audiotapes from its normal practice, in which tapes aren’t released until the end of the week. This time, tapes and transcripts will be posted on the Court’s website as soon as they are available; the Court’s public-information office says that the morning session should be available by 2 p.m. each day and that the afternoon session on Wednesday, March 28 (the only afternoon session), should be available by 4 p.m. that day.
This means that the public will be able to hear—the same day—the tone used by justices in asking questions or, for some justices, making arguments. The admonition given recently in this blog by Minnesota appellate judge Francis J. Connolly is one that members of the U.S. Supreme Court should pay heed to next week: “We need to remember that we are not cross-examining a hostile witness but rather probing an attorney’s argument.”
Because of the media attention that will be focused on the U.S. Supreme Court next week, this will be a seminal moment for public perceptions of the justice system. The justices can do a great service to the country by demonstrating procedural fairness throughout the arguments.
Steve Leben and Kevin Burke
[For background about the Supreme Court’s proceedings on the health-care law, and for links to transcripts and audiotapes as they are released, go to SCOTUSblog.]
So what’s procedural fairness thing, anyway? Professor Tom Tyler has identified four basic components that comprise procedural fairness and drive public opinion about the courts:
1. Voice: litigants’ ability to participate in the case by expressing their viewpoint;
2. Neutrality: consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision makers, and a transparency about how decisions are made;
3. Respect: individuals are treated with dignity and their rights are explicitly protected; and
4. Trust: authorities are benevolent, caring, and sincerely trying to help the litigants—a trust garnered by listening to individuals and by explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs.
Now that you know what it is, is it important? It sure seems to be. An extensive 2005 study in the California state courts found that perceptions of procedural fairness were “the strongest predictor by far” of public confidence in the California court system. Simply, if litigants or members of the public perceived that the courts provided fair treatment in the aspects Tyler identified, their overall opinion of the court system was much more positive. This was true across different ethnic groups, across gender, and across income and educational levels.
In addition, procedural fairness plays an important role in improving compliance with court orders. Several studies strongly suggest that when litigants perceive that they’ve been treated fairly, they are more likely to comply with the court orders that follow.
For a useful introduction to procedural-fairness principles, three articles from Court Review, the journal of the American Judges Association, will do the trick:
[Steve Leben]
Procedural Fairness For Courts and Judges 