Archive for the ‘Communication’ Tag
The Center for Court Innovation (CCI) is seeking courts to participate in an assessment of each court’s procedural-fairness practices. CCI is accepting applications until June 12 from local courts with the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases.
The official Request for Proposals gives full details on the project, but CCI says that it hopes to advance procedural-justice goals “by (1) highlighting promising practices for the field at large, (2) helping jurisdictions identify problem areas, and (3) outlining short- and longer-term plans to implement appropriate interventions.”
CCI suggests that this project “is targeted to criminal courts interested in deepening their understanding of procedural justice and examining whether and how their current practice promotes the core elements of procedural justice: voice, respect, understanding, and neutrality.” The selected sites will gain the feedback of outsiders who are familiar with the background research in this area.
The project will focus on four key areas at each site:
· Providing information about court procedures to court users and to the community;
· Fostering a user-friendly courthouse environment;
· Developing mechanisms to solicit and respond to feedback from staff and court users; and
· Improving the communication strategies used by judges and other court staff.
Project staff will provide suggestions for improving practices in each court.
As judges, we know that we should practice the principles of procedural fairness—voice, respect, neutrality, and trust. But what specific things might we do in the courtroom?
As part of its courtroom-communication training program for the state court in Milwaukee, the Center for Court Innovation put together a list of observable behaviors that court observers could look for to see whether judges were practicing these principles. Among the behaviors listed there:
· The court started on time.
· The judge apologized for any delay in the starting of court.
· The judge or other court staff clearly explained court etiquette and rules at the beginning of the court session.
· The judge provided some overview of what might happen during various court appearances and how decisions would be made.
· The judge assured the defendants that all of the evidence would be considered before making any decision.
· The judge made eye contact with the audience upon entering the court.
· The judge introduced himself/herself by name.
· The judge thanked the audience members for their on-time appearance.
· The judge acknowledged the experience of defendants while waiting for their cases to be called (e.g., having to sit quietly, waiting for a potentially long period, etc.).
As far as I know, there’s no research so specific as to track the effect of any of these specific behaviors on courtroom participants. But all of them seem to be reasonable suggestions that would help lead those in the courtroom to conclude that a judge is sincere and caring.
We will note other lists of observable courtroom behaviors that may promote a sense of fairness in the courtroom in a later blog post. The full report of the Center for Court Innovation’s Milwaukee court-training program is on the web.
For those of you who have been following along on this series, you’ve now gotten a good overview of procedural-fairness principles from Kevin Burke’s 90-minute webinar (still available) and you’ve given some thought to how you might improve your listening skills. The next step is to evaluate how you’re doing at implementing procedural-fairness principles and listening skills on the bench.
A good way to approach self-evaluation is to review your performance on videotape. Several years ago, six New Hampshire judges (Gerry Boyle, Sue Carbon, Ned Gordon, James Leary, Deborah Kane Rein, and Mike Ryan) agreed to be videotaped for a half day on the bench. Kevin and I reviewed the videos and used clips for a procedural-fairness presentation to all the judges in New Hampshire. But the six volunteer judges had their own homework assignment—watching their own videotapes and telling us what they had learned.
Their responses (set out below) show that you can learn a great deal by going through such a process. For the New Hampshire videotaping, the judges simply announced at the beginning of a docket or a hearing that they were being videotaped solely for judicial-education purposes and that the camera would be focused only on the judge. No one objected to having their hearings videotaped in this manner. Court staff members simply set up a camera on a tripod in the corner of a courtroom and let it run.
For a judge who wants to go beyond self-assessment, you could give the video to a trusted colleague, to your spouse, to a communications professor or graduate student, or to someone else whose opinion you would respect. The responses of the New Hampshire judges suggest that you can learn a great deal.
RESPONSES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDGES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR VIDEOTAPES
Question 1: Please give 2 observations of things you noted when watching the tapes that you may not have been aware of or paid sufficient attention to before.
A. Time seems to go faster when you are sitting on the bench than when you are watching the hearing. Parties from other cases who are waiting to be heard are probably bored stiff and must feel that the Court has wasted their time.
B. An enormous amount of time is taken up in completing forms while on the bench, particularly in criminal matters. This diverts the judge’s focus away from the litigants and may make it appear like the judge is not paying attention to what is being said.
C. I was reading and sometimes even writing while defendants were speaking. I was flipping complaints and other paperwork over and reading them while the defendant is presenting his position on bail conditions. Pretty rude.
D. [There] is an appearance of impatience. I say appearance because I believe I am patient but, when presented with dozens of files to get through in a restricted time period, I have a sense of urgency that appears to me to come across as impatience. Rush, rush, rush.
E. I have a tendency to look angry.
F. I nod my head a lot—on the tape it’s annoying. Perhaps in person it’s not as bad (I hope!).
G. I had no idea how much I nod during the course of a presentation. I am not sure whether this is good (because it shows I am affirming that I am listening) or whether it seems that I am agreeing with what they are saying, which can cause some problems.
H. I was already aware of how slow I speak (not just on the bench but generally), but I was not aware of the number of large gaps in time that occur when I am thinking and how much of an opportunity it provides for a litigant/lawyer to fill the gap with unnecessary talk.
I. The first behavior I noted was it appeared as though I was constantly looking down. I have found that in marital cases, the taking of good notes is very important so I look down to write more often than I would in other type cases. I think participants could find my inconsistent eye contact as meaning I was not paying attention.
J. A second behavior was to ask counsel questions before asking the pro se litigant. I do not know how this is perceived by the pro se litigant. I do it only because counsel usually has a better handle on what the issues are.
Question 2: Please list 2 items on which you believe you might be able to improve your on-the-bench performance after viewing the tapes.
A. Don’t call a hearing and then spend 10 minutes trying to figure out the background of the case on the bench. I should read the file in advance or take a recess if necessary in order to appear informed when the hearing begins.
B. I show my emotions easily. I tend to show more warmth toward attorneys I know and respect. I could perhaps be more stoic in that regard, particularly when the other party is pro se.
C. I plan to put the paperwork down and make eye contact with the defendant when s/he is speaking. This change may well further exacerbate the issue of time constraints, but I was truly struck by my putting my head down and doing busy work while someone was speaking to me.
D. I plan to have the courtroom clerk separate those files with multiple or more complex charges so I can review them before the hearing. With such preparation, I will have a better idea of the charges when I address the defendant and not have to read everything for the first time with him/her standing there.
E. It would be helpful to smile and make a more welcoming greeting at the beginning of the case. I always thought I did, but at least from this angle, it seemed very curt.
F. I should try to sound and look more even-tempered. Even though I am questioning the litigant (and suspicious of what he was telling me), it is nonetheless important to appear open-minded and even-tempered.
G. I realized that I need to smile more to make people feel more at ease in the courtroom.
H. I would like to decrease the number of pauses I create. In addition to the problem expressed above, I wonder if it makes people feel that I lack confidence which in turn may make them less confident in me. I am not sure how to do this since it is the way I speak in general, but I might be able to come up with some helpful technique.
I. If I were looking at this tape, I might think that I have all the time in the world to hear these cases because each hearing was longer than probably necessary. It was just an unusual day (generally we are swamped), but each case stayed within the time allowed on the docket (and the last one with the prisoner was just marking time until the plaintiffs (wife and daughter) appeared, which they did right after Gina turned off the camera). I am sure, however, that I am wont to allow people to go on longer than needed. I am not sure that this related to procedural fairness, but it does effect the court calendar. So, I could work on being more efficient while still giving everyone a full opportunity to speak.
J. The first thing I need to work on is to be better prepared before the hearing so that it does not appear that I am unprepared by going through the file to look at the Motion when introducing the case. I try to read the pleadings the morning of the hearings but sometimes when I get to a hearing, I have forgotten what the issues were.
K. The second thing is to remember to explain legal terms to the pro se litigants. I sometimes forget that not everyone speaks legalese.
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For those of you who have watched the procedural-fairness webinar (see our last blog post), you’ve got a good overview of procedural-fairness principles and how they often play out in court. (If you didn’t watch it, you still can—just go here.) Whether you’ve watched it or not, let’s move next to one of the basic skills every judge needs—the ability to be a good listener.
For most of us, our time in school focused to a large extent on developing reading and writing skills; remarkably little time was spent on listening skills. Yet much of the information presented to a trial judge is presented orally in the courtroom—the judge’s ability to do the job well is greatly dependent on the judge’s listening skills.
So what can you do to improve your listening skills? I’ve got a simple suggestion for you, one that you can accomplish with an initial investment of $17 and less than an hour of your time.
The $17 is for an online self-assessment of your listening skills, which comes from a company called HRDQ. The HRDQ Learning to Listen assessment includes both the self-assessment scores of your strengths and weaknesses and HRDQ’s tips for better listening in three areas:
• Staying focused—you can’t effectively listen if you don’t stay focused on what the speaker is communicating.
• Capturing the message—you’re a better listener if you work to hear what the speaker is actually trying to say, not what you expect him or her to say.
• Helping the speaker—you’re more likely to hear what the speaker is really trying to communicate if you avoid behaviors that would distract the speaker and show that you’re open to the speaker’s expression of his or her message.
To be sure, there are constraints in a legal proceeding on the presentation of information to judges. Sometimes, though, we lose track of how difficult it can be in our daily working environment—the courtroom—for others to present information to us. We also can lose focus on how easy it is for us to become distracted or otherwise to miss out on what is being presented.
But in the courtroom, where litigants and lawyers are presenting information to us every day, they have a right to our attention. Spending the time to take the HRDQ Learning to Listen assessment—and then taking a bit more time to think about how the tips HRDQ provides may play out in the courtroom—will make you a more effective judge for 2014.
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The Center for Court Innovation (CCI) has obtained grant funding to provide training to some trial courts on procedural-justice principles. The project is a partnership between CCI, the National Judicial College, and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance.
The training is explicitly based upon Professor Tom Tyler’s work in procedural fairness, and CCI has dubbed the program “The Improving Courtroom Communication Project.” It will attempt to improve procedural justice in a criminal-court setting. The training curriculum will consist of five modules:
• The Role of Procedural Fairness, covering research findings on the impact of procedural fairness in various justice-system contexts;
• Verbal Communication, including how written and oral communication in the courtroom affects fairness perceptions;
• Nonverbal Communication, including how body language, tone, and other nonverbal cues affect fairness perceptions;
• Considering Special Populations, including how communication can be adapted to meet the needs of various court participants; and
• Implementing Procedural Fairness, including group idea-generation and the development of individualized action plans.
The curriculum was tested in a Milwaukee pilot-training exercise. CCI is now accepting applications and will select three criminal courts to participate in this training program, which will be free of charge to the selected courts. To be eligible, applicant sites must be a local or state court with jurisdiction to hear criminal cases (including multi-jurisdictional courts).
Full information on how to apply for the training can be found at the CCI website. Applications must be received no later than 5 p.m. Eastern time on Friday, June 14, 2013.
Guest Blogger: Michael King
Procedural justice, therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving or solution-focused courts have brought increased focus on the actions of judges and lawyers in court in terms of their potential to enhance or diminish litigants’ and public respect for court orders and the justice system. With this development has come increased appreciation of the significance of language, body language and processes in the legal process.
A case decided by the Supreme Court of New South Wales illustrated how what is regarded as a common courtesy in general society when used in court may be seen to be alienating or even offensive by a party or witness to the proceedings. The case reminds judges and lawyers against complacency and of the need to be careful in their selection of language and use of mannerisms and processes.
The case involved an application to the Supreme Court in its inherent wardship jurisdiction for an order that a child be returned to the care of the mother. Exercising jurisdiction under statute, a magistrate sitting in the Children’s Court of New South Wales had placed the child in the care of the Minister for Human Services. Typically children’s courts in Australia exercise both criminal and welfare jurisdiction over children. If a child is need of care and protection, authorities can apply to the court for an order placing the child in State care or seek other orders.
Much of the judge’s decision involves the merits of the application, but the judge also examined the actions of the magistrate and one of the lawyers in court and their effect on the mother of the child. The first issue related to whether the court had properly included the mother in the process leading to the court making an interim care order. The judge held that it had not and suggested that in the process, the court may have contributed to the mother’s hostile attitude towards the Department for Human Services. The judge acknowledged the pressures of a busy court list, but stressed that even with such pressures courts should meaningfully include parties in the decision-making process.
The second issue related to certain practices used by counsel at the final order hearing. Essentially, the judge frowned on the practice of lawyers and the magistrate exchanging “good morning” or of a lawyer saying “good morning” to a witness, a practice that was used at the final order hearing.
Here are relevant passages of the judge’s decision:
The history of the proceedings
[6] The Department applied to the Children’s Court on 28 April 2009 for an interim order under s 79(1) Care Act allocating parental responsibility for Anna to the Minister. I have read the transcript. The application came before the Court on 29 April. Present were Ms Wilson, who had given birth only two days before, the Department’s solicitor and Mr Chapman, solicitor, who represented the interests of Anna. How Mr Chapman came to be appointed as Anna’s separate representative was not explained to Ms Wilson.
[7] Ms Wilson said that she would like an adjournment to enable her to instruct a solicitor. After some discussion with the Department’s solicitor and Mr Chapman, the Magistrate made an interim care order and stood the proceedings over 11 May. Unfortunately, Ms Wilson was not even asked by the Magistrate what was her attitude to the making of an interim care order. The transcript shows that the discussion seemed to be confined to the Magistrate, the solicitor for the Department and Mr Chapman, and it appears that Ms Wilson was entirely overlooked. One can imagine that Ms Wilson, without the benefit of legal representation and in a state of some shock at having her new-born baby taken from her two days previously, was in a vulnerable and confused state at this hearing. The fact that she was not even consulted as to the Magistrate’s proposed course of action and that its consequences were not explained to her by the Magistrate could well have given her an impression that her rights were being disregarded entirely.
….
Some observations about the conduct of the case in Court
[102] As I said at the beginning of this judgment, some aspects of the case call for comment.
[103] The first is the way in which the first hearing in the Children’s Court on 29 April 2009 was conducted. A reading of the transcript left me with the strong impression that what had occurred might well have contributed significantly to the hostility which Ms Wilson demonstrates to the Department and to her apparent lack of co-operation in a number of directions hearings in the Children’s Court.
[104] As I have recounted at paras 6–7 above, no one explained to Ms Wilson what was going on in court or asked her if she had anything to say. As a result of what appeared to be a rather quick and “in club” discussion between the Bench and Bar Table, an interim care order was made. The most important person in the courtroom at that time — the mother whose child had been taken from her at birth two days ago — was ignored.
[105] Every judicial officer is familiar with the pressures of a busy list and looks for a means of getting through it efficiently. The Children’s Court is a particularly fraught and stressful arena of conflict. A case such as the present shows how important it is in the administration of justice that judicial officers do their best to involve litigants meaningfully in the process by which justice is done.
[106] The second matter calling for comment occurred in the conduct of the case in this court but it is not peculiar to this case — it has been observed by a number of Judges in the Supreme Court and it is currently the subject of discussion between this court, the Bar Association and the Law Society. I refer to the practice of advocates, which seems to have developed over recent years, of announcing their appearances to the Bench or beginning the examination of witnesses with the salutation “Good morning, your Honour” or “Good afternoon, Mr Smith”. I am informed that this is a practice which has developed in the Magistrates’ Courts. The Supreme Court is of the view that it is a practice which should be abandoned in contentious litigation.
[107] Lest it be thought that this view is the relic of a stilted and now-outdated judicial self-esteem, let me illustrate, by reference to what occurred in this case, how the practice can cause substantial misperceptions prejudicial to the conduct of a fair trial.
[108] Mr Chapman, who is obviously a highly experienced and capable solicitor frequently conducting cases in the Children’s Court, routinely greeted me with the salutation of “Good morning, your Honour” or “Good afternoon, your Honour” each time he announced his appearance at directions hearings and on each day of the trial. In accordance with the usual etiquette of this court, Mr Moore of Counsel did not. Mr Chapman’s apparent familiarity with the Judge could have caused a misapprehension in the mind of Ms Wilson, already distrustful of the judicial system, that Mr Chapman enjoyed a relationship with the Judge which was something more than merely professional. Such a suspicion should never be allowed to arise. A Judge should not feel compelled to allay such a suspicion by rebuking an advocate for misplaced courtesy.
[109] More importantly, Mr Chapman routinely began his cross examination with the salutation “Good morning, Ms Wilson (or Mrs Wilson)”. He was met with a stony silence. How could Ms Wilson or Mrs Wilson greet politely the man who was avowedly intent on taking Anna away from them by destroying their evidence? A witness in their position would inevitably feel it to be the most odious hypocrisy to be compelled to return the salutation with a polite “Good morning, Mr Chapman”.
[110] Mr Chapman, of course, noted the rebuff and, on occasion, directed a meaningful look at the Bench. I do not think he intended it, but the impression which could well have been conveyed to Ms Wilson and Mrs Wilson was that, even before Mr Chapman had begun his cross examination, he had already unfairly scored a point against them because he had put them in the position in which he could say — eloquently, by a look, not even a word — “You see what rude and unpleasant people we are dealing with here, your Honour”.
[111] I wish to make it clear that, by these remarks, I intend no personal criticism of Mr Chapman. He conducted the case professionally and courteously, in what he saw to be the best interests of Anna. I am sure that, in using salutations as I have described, Mr Chapman was merely following a practice which is now routine in the Magistrates’ Courts.
[112] However, a witness should never be placed in the position of having to greet politely a cross examiner who is an avowed opponent. An advocate should never use this technique to score against a witness. It is far better to avoid the perception that this technique of discrediting a witness is being used unfairly.
[113] For these reasons, the practice of salutations by advocates should be completely abandoned in all courts in all contentious litigation.
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This has also been the view of judges of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, one of whom is reputed to have rebuked counsel who said good morning to the judge in court by stating “Mr Z, this is not a social occasion, it is a state occasion”. My own preference in court is for counsel to begin with “Your Honour, I appear for Mr X” or the more formal “May it please the court, I appear for Ms Y”.
The citation for the case is: Wilson v Department for Human Services [2010] NSWSC 1489. The full judgment is available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2010/1489.html.
Dr. Michael King is a magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Western Australia and an adjunct Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University.
In an earlier post, I asked others for their suggestions on how judges should approach oral argument or otherwise improve their skills at achieving procedural fairness.
Here are two more responses.
Kevin Burke
Rebecca Love Kourlis is the Executive Director of the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System. She was appointed to the state Supreme Court in May 1995. She previously served as a district court judge and worked in private practice in Colorado.
Her comments: “Oral argument is a unique opportunity to get an ‘executive summary’ of the important issues in the case from the perspective of the advocates. Both as an outgrowth of my experience as a trial judge, and as an appellate judge, I have the following suggestions for judges. First, prepare. Read the briefs, distill the issues down to what you think is most important and identify the aspects that trouble you. This would seem to be axiomatic, but I fear that it is not. There are most definitely judges who take the bench without having spent the necessary time to focus in on the issues in dispute. Second, be respectful: of counsel (let them make their argument) and of your colleagues. Hypothetical questions are seldom a good use of counsel’s or the Court’s time; and leveraging questions against another member of the Court is transparent and ineffective. If there is a built-in division on the Court, it is not likely to go away as a result of some targeted question to counsel. Third, remember that oral argument may be the ONLY chance the litigants have to see the appellate process at work. The impressions that the Court leaves will be lasting. Hence, judges must conduct themselves in a dignified manner that reflects well on the system. I remember all too well, as an advocate before an appellate court in Colorado (a long time ago), being upbraided for having seated my client at counsel table, rather than in the audience. The client was completely befuddled, and asked me how the Court could possibly justify excluding from counsel’s table the person who had the most to gain or lose from the proceeding. All of my explanations about passion or prejudice fell on deaf ears. And, in the vein of public perception, judges should make sure that arguments are available to the public – either by audio or video recording. Although argument may not be the most important part of the case from the judges’ perspective, it is the only public part of the case. Court proceedings are by, for and of the public – unless some extraordinary circumstance dictates otherwise.”
Lewis Remle is the Top Point Getter in Minnesota in this year’s Super Lawyers list. This is the ninth time he has received this prestigious honor:
His comments: “I think one of the biggest concerns trial lawyers have is whether the trial judge they will be arguing to has read the briefs which are the subject of the motion before the court. In defense of trial judges, their schedules are such that often times they might not have had the opportunity to review the motion papers as thoroughly as they might hope. One of the most effective methods I have seen trial judges use is to start the proceedings with specific questions he or she would like the lawyers to respond to relating to the dispute. This method has the immediate effect of sending the message that the judge has read the materials and puts the lawyers on notice that they need to tailor their arguments to not only answer the questions or questions but also that simply regurgitating the arguments in their brief will not be a n effective or persuasive presentation. I realize that this method is not always possible and may not apply to some motions but to the extent a judge can pre-empt the structure of a lawyers argument I think it is more likely that there will be some benefit to oral argument because I think lot of lawyers assume the judge has not had the opportunity to read the materials and so they simply parrot what is already in their briefs.”
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held an argument about the applicability of the plain-error standard to unsettled issues as of time of trial. It is an important issue of law and as a result the United States Supreme Court appointed Patricia Gilley to represent Mr. Henderson. The transcript begins as follows:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We’ll hear argument this morning in Case 11-9307, Henderson v. United States.
MS. GILLEY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: There are three primary points I would like to focus on this morning during my argument. First, the question presented by Mr. Henderson involves a very small subset of cases which are — which come before the Court under Rule 55 — 52(b) each year. These are the cases that were referred to as the special case in the Olano decision. They have errors which, at the time of trial, were unsettled or unclear; but, by the time they made it to the appellate court, they had become clear by a clarifying rule or a decision. Second -
JUSTICE SCALIA: What — what about the time they come up here? 52(b) applies to every court, does it not?
The transcript is an interesting read, but what you will not find is Ms. Gilley able to state what her two other primary points were—at least in that language. Ms. Gilley got out her first primary point and the barrage of questions from the justices followed.
No one seriously should think that lawyers have a right to summarize their three primary points at oral argument at the United States Supreme Court or at a motion at the trial court level. Oral argument is for the benefit of the judges, who can seek answers to factual and legal questions prompted by the briefs. Lawyers have the chance to make their full argument in their written brief. Few things frustrate a judge more than a lawyer in oral argument just reading from their brief.
But at the same time there is a need for judges to strike the right balance. Voice and respect (two of the essential elements of procedural fairness) ought to cause every judge at every level to occasionally reflect on their “style” during oral argument. Being an effective judge in presiding over an oral argument is a skill as much as it is an opportunity to learn about an individual case.
There are ways to get very good at presiding over an oral argument. Reviewing a video is a terrific step. Perhaps not as good, reviewing a transcript is an option. Asking a colleague to watch (and offering to repay the favor) can give judges insight. Getting feedback from lawyers occurs where there are judicial-performance evaluations, but if you sit in a place where there is no official judicial-performance evaluation, judges can create their own feedback surveys.
In an effort to foster a discussion about how judges should approach oral argument or improve your skills at achieving procedural fairness we asked several judicial experts. Here are their thoughts.
Kevin Burke
Justice Walter Carpeneti sits on the Alaska Supreme Court. He is a former trial judge and former Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court. His comments:
First, while the form of oral argument suggests that it is an opportunity for counsel to present an argument to the court, the reality is that it is an opportunity for the court to have its questions answered. I say this because the briefs contain the parties’ arguments, crafted exactly as they wish to present them. Assuming that the judges read the briefs before the argument, all of the information exchange from counsel to the court has already occurred. (If this assumption is bad, this whole discussion becomes pointless.) Thus, attorneys should not treat judges’ questions as annoying interruptions of their carefully-prepared presentations; they should welcome questions as a window into what the judge is thinking and an opportunity to correct any errors the judge might be about to make.
Second, this reality should not trump the need for courtesy (both to counsel and to one’s judicial colleagues) and for projecting the appearance of fairness. Thus, I’d suggest that an appellate court should ordinarily let counsel make an introduction that (concisely) sets out the attorney’s main points before starting with questions. I’d suggest that interrupting counsel’s answers should be held to a minimum—to be done, for example, only if counsel has misunderstood the question, is rambling in his or her answer, or is obviously trying to obfuscate. I’d suggest that interruption generally is rude not only to counsel, but also often to one’s colleagues on an appellate bench, because interrupting counsel’s answer often means that the questioner has not gotten the benefit of a full answer to the question that he or she asked.
Third, I think that courts ought not to be rigidly parsimonious with time when the court’s questions have taken up all of counsel’s time. While the most able advocates can work their “outline” points (along with their key support for those points) into their answers along the way, not all attorneys are adept at this technique. We should be careful not to leave counsel with the notion that, because the court asked nonstop questions, he or she did not even get the chance to get a word (or a whole argument) in edgewise.
So, my summary: The main purpose of oral argument is to give the judge(s) the opportunity to ask questions and challenge the advocates to defend their positions, but this questioning should take place with courtesy and respect, and the attorney should not be left thinking that he or she was denied the opportunity to be heard.
Judge Rene Worke is a Judge on the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Prior to be appointed to the Court of Appeals she served as a trial judge, including a term as chief judge of her district. Her comments:
When trial court judges ask me about my life as an appellate judge, I always start out with, “If I knew then what I know now!” Appellate oral argument is drastically different than hearing oral presentations at the trial-court level. At the trial-court level, a judge has a myriad of cases on the docket and argument time limits are determined by the individual judges willingness to indulge, as well as calendar backup. As a solo decision-maker, a trial judge is able to ask questions of both counsel in logical sequence, i.e., “What do each of you think is the appropriate date for running of the statute of limitations?” rather than forgetting that particular question when it finally comes to respondent’s turn at the podium. A trial judge is focused on making decisions, moving counsel along, and keeping an eye on the time clock. An appellate judge is focused on clarifying points raised in the brief and deciding what points are most persuasive in an allotted and predetermined time frame—with the luxury of nitpicking the entire record before and after argument.
Appellate oral argument can be tedious. We sit for several cases, all presented on the same day in sequence. Once we are “out there,” we can expect to sit for several hours. Because we are not “solo” judges, we must also be mindful of being courteous to our two colleagues. On occasion, oral argument can turn into ping-pong match with judges eliciting from the lawyers record-facts that support a position they have. These fact-finding questions—or posturing—by an appellate judge can frustrate colleagues—questions can be slanted, redundant, very long, and more like a statement than a genuine question seeking an answer. Lots of judicial energy can be spent to support one’s judicial theory.
And much like solo decision-makers, appellate jurists also bring their personal likes and dislikes to the bench. For example I am known as a by-the-rules judge. When I preside, it is not likely that the time limits will be extended (after all, the lawyers can say it in their briefs and be succinct in presentation), but this is my will. When a colleague is presiding, he or she may do the exact opposite, and I am subject to that timetable. At a recent bench meeting, this very statement was made after a newer judge mentioned that he wished both sides had a rebuttal opportunity (”When you preside you can do what you want.”). Lacking collegiality as a panel, this can occur.
My particular court is courteous, and we haven’t had any specific instances of someone hogging the questions, getting us off track, or so on. However, I talk to other state appellate judges and hear just the opposite occurring. I think most of us agree that one’s professional life can be good or bad depending on who you are teamed with—much like marriage!
A final obstacle to my court experiences is the fact that we travel to hearing sites. Our official chambers may be in one location, but on occasion a judge may choose to work from home or be assigned to work at another site. This requires an additional challenge in scheduling meetings to discuss case outcome.
Personal performance goals: At oral argument, my preference is for the appellant to tell us what we are empowered to do under his theory, e.g., this is a de novo determination by the appellate court—there is no deference to district court—or the trial court erred in [X] and we need to do [Y]. I remind lawyers that I am a former district court judge when they do not concede the discretion afforded to district court. I am most proud of my judicial skills when I hold back and refrain from asking questions—silly Perry Mason style questions. No matter how ridiculous a position, it is not likely that an appellant will concede how wrong his position is by a judge pointing out every error in his case. “You’re right, let me withdraw my appeal,” just isn’t going to happen. I do enjoy spirited debates, but it doesn’t add much to the presentation to point out all shortcomings. Asking less or no questions may even lead to a shorter oral presentation under those circumstances.
In my opinion, tools such as peer or colleague critiques are likely the best mechanism for an appellate judge to get fair feedback. Watching a video will show personal tics or traits on the bench, but the viewer is not likely to discern a questioning style or manner that could be improved.
Eric Magnuson is the former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court and for decades has been one of the Midwest’s premier appellate lawyers. His thoughts:
It is very difficult to instruct judges on how to conduct oral argument because argument is intended primarily to answer the questions of the court.
Having said that, I tell lawyers preparing for argument to begin with a one-minute declarative statement on why they win. It should not be a list of the arguments that will be made (per your example), but it should be a powerfully concise statement of the ultimate merits. Viz. – “Appellate courts can and do reverse jury verdicts when the plaintiff has failed to prove every element of their legal claim. This is such a case. The judgment cannot stand.” The why behind that argument comes next, but the advocate has staked out his or her territory.
Another example – “The broad discretion of the trial court in framing jury instructions does not include the discretion to inaccurately state the law. That was the case here. My client is entitled to a new trial.” If there is a second issue, a second sentence should suffice. If there is a third, perhaps another sentence, but by then the court may be losing interest, and perhaps a more global statement would be better.
If the advocate takes the first seconds of an argument to state an affirmative proposition, then the rest of the argument is just support. Questions can follow on any topic, but the advocate has made the essence of the argument.
I suspect that this may sound simplistic, but in my experience, a clear and concise statement of the merits right out of the box establishes more control for the advocate, and provides less opportunity for the court to move the argument in a different direction at the very start.
After that, Katie bar the door. But when the time is nearly up, the advocate should repeat the same opening statement—leaving the court with a clear idea of the relief sought and the reason it should be given.
Even the most aggressive judge is likely to let the lawyer get out two to three sentences, particularly if they are positive and forceful.
Guest Blogger: Maxine Goodman
My recent article, Removing the Umpire’s Mask: The Propriety and Impact of Judicial Apologies, 4 Utah L. Rev. 1529 (2011), describes instances when judges have apologized in their courtrooms to parties or lawyers. Examples include Dallas State District Judge Faith Johnson apologizing to a defendant’s family for throwing a “recapture party” after the defendant, who was briefly a fugitive, was captured. At the party, the judge had balloons and served ice cream. Judge Johnson later said she was sorry if her celebration offended anyone. Judge Thomas M. Lynch IV apologized to Anthony Caravella who spent 26 years in jail and was later exonerated based on DNA evidence. The judge apologized to Caravella on behalf of the criminal justice system of Florida. And, Judge Vanessa Gilmore, a federal district court judge in Houston, Texas, apologized to the victims of a mortgage scam after sentencing the defendant to what the judge considered too light a sentence.
These examples are but a few of the instances when judges apologize in court, either on their own behalf or on behalf of the State. The article posits that judicial apologies are warranted and necessary when a judge is responsible for causing harm to a party or lawyer and when the apology is sincere. To be sincere, the apology must acknowledge the harm and not provide any conditions, like “if this behavior offended anyone.” As an example of a proper apology, Justice Scalia apologized for unnecessarily chastising a lawyer for failing to include a reference to a statute in the lawyer’s brief, when he had, in fact, done so. Justice Scalia apologized, saying “Mr. Bress, I want to apologize to you for accusing you of not printing 2254(d) and (e) in your brief. You indeed did.”
Judges should not apologize when they are not responsible for the wrongdoing and their apology is not authentic. These apologies come across as disingenuous and are unlikely to elicit forgiveness. When the apology is politically motivated or compelled by accusations of judicial wrongdoing, the judge’s apology is likely to serve as a confusing gesture, unlikely to help the offended party regain trust in the judge and, by extension, the judiciary (and potentially the legal system).
The primary reason for concern over judicial apologies is the need for procedural fairness. Research shows that parties are typically more likely to consider a court proceeding fair when the judge has treated them courteously, with dignity and respect. According to this approach, a judge treating a party with courtesy is more important for the party’s perception of the fairness of a proceeding than the outcome of the hearing or trial. Accordingly, a judicial apology can play a significant role in a party’s perception of the court’s fairness when a judge who has, for example, lost his temper and chastised a party or lawyer, offers an authentic apology to the party or lawyer.
Maxine Goodman is a Professor at the South Texas College of Law
Guest Blogger: Douglas G. Denton
When the United States Supreme Court issued its written opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), it did so at 10:00 p.m. on a Friday night. This culminated an intense week of briefing and oral argument regarding a Florida recount of the presidential vote. By releasing the opinion on a Friday night, the court genuinely believed that it was acting in the best interests of the nation – and was complying with requests from media – to provide immediate and instant access to the high court’s opinion, precisely when it was completed. What happened, however, was immediate on-air confusion. In their extreme excitement, reporters quickly realized that they did not know how to read a high court opinion. On the following Saturday, The New York Times reported on Friday evening’s events: “As Mr. (Brian) Williams offered bits of encouragement, the (MSNBC) reporter began flipping anxiously through the document. ‘Hang on, Brian!’ Mr. (Bob) Kur said, struggling to find a page that offered some encapsulation of the decision. ‘Looking for the summary.’ When at last he found something, Mr. Kur began reading aloud, but the legalese was almost impossible to make sense of. The mandate placed on television for instant clarity and coherence proved elusive … One problem for the networks was extracting a clear narrative (regarding the substance of the opinion) from the many people they had reading the document simultaneously.” (Peter Marks, Contesting the Vote: The Media; Once Again, the TV Mystery Prevails as Late-Night Fare, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2000, at A1).
Memories of the fallout from the release of the Bush v. Gore decision prompted members of the 2008–2011 Harvard Executive Session for State Court Leaders to begin a dialogue regarding how and when opinions of the high court should be released. For example, what tools or strategies might encourage broad media and public understanding of opinions, particularly when a common high court policy is that “the opinion speaks for itself”? This dialogue led to extensive research by the Administrative Office of the Courts in California and the National Center for State Courts, including a survey of all 50 state high courts. It also lead to a new Harvard Executive Session Paper, “Opinions as the Voice of the Court,” which is co-authored by Wallace B. Jefferson, Chief Justice of Texas; William C. Vickrey, Retired Administrative Director, California Administrative Office of the Courts; and myself. The paper discusses the workings of state supreme courts and effective communication through the lens of procedural fairness.
Over the past decade, all courts – from the U.S. Supreme Court to the hundreds of trial and appellate courts across the nation – have evolved and learned how to better inform, prepare and engage with modern audiences. Effective collaboration between media, bench and bar is crucial to achieve public understanding of rulings, a key ingredient that helps achieve procedural fairness. “Opinions as the Voice of the Court” speaks directly to how the preparation and dissemination of high court opinions (including use of tools like plain language, summarization, and effective communication via the web) may help courts to ensure that each individual opinion—the voice of the court—successfully communicates and demonstrates to various audiences that the court has listened to parties, fulfilled its unique role as an arbiter of justice, and reached a fair outcome.
Douglas G. Denton is a Senior Court Services Analyst at the California Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), San Francisco
Procedural Fairness For Courts and Judges 